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ABSTRACT 
In a counterinsurgency (COIN) the local population becomes the center of 
gravity. Over the past three years, the U.S. military has rewritten many field 
manuals that focus on COIN, to include a significant change to FM 3-0, 
Operations, and a complete revision of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. These 
changes in doctrine have forced the U.S. military’s conventional force to 
reconsider its use of the kinetic force and begin to understand the use of more 
non-kinetic means, or the softer side of COIN, in order to reach sustainable 
peace.  If non-kinetic actions are the way forward, how should units (battalion 
and below) be applying the softer side of COIN? This thesis considers through 
context and assessment the goals that are needed to achieve the right mix of 
kinetic and non-kinetic actions. Practitioners suggest that information operations, 
situational awareness, cultural awareness and empathy are key components of 
effective counterinsurgency.  This thesis argues further that network 
development and command influence have vital multiplier effects on these 
components.  Without command influence, none are likely to take hold.  
Therefore, the thesis argues that command influence is the key aspect in 
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I. CONDUCTING THE SOFTER SIDE OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military 
force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. 
(Army) The hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
depends.  
— Definition of Center of Gravity from Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, 
Operational Terms and Graphics1 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 In conventional warfare, the center of gravity is usually derived from a 
specific enemy force or a decisive terrain feature.  However, in a 
counterinsurgency (COIN), the local population becomes the center of gravity.  
This is a difficult and controversial concept to grasp, especially for a conventional 
force that has always trained according to the principle that the actions taken by 
each unit on the ground mold the environment — not civilians on the battlefield.2  
Although if one were to stop and think about the previous sentence, “the actions 
taken by each unit,” are exactly what will win or lose the counterinsurgent’s fight.   
 The U.S. military has conducted both COIN and reconstruction operations 
over the past one hundred years; however, we have not conducted both of these 
operations concurrently — as we are in Iraq and Afghanistan.  To add to the U.S. 
hardships, the military has been preparing for the next conventional high intensity 
conflict, rather than a low intensity COIN.  The lack of training and focus has 
caused a steep learning curve for both leaders and Soldiers.  In an observation 
of GEN Petraeus, then 101st Airborne Division commander, by his Assistant 
Division Commander in reference to Iraq: “The commanding general found 
                                            
1 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 1997) 7. 
2 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, 2005: 2. 
 2
himself in a very violent, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment.”3  If a 
seasoned officer is making this observation, then what can we say about the 
young officers and Soldiers who have just joined the military and are fighting a 
COIN at the grassroots level? 
 Over the last three years, the U.S. military has rewritten many field 
manuals that focus on COIN, including a significant change to FM 3-0, 
Operations, which places stability and reconstruction operations on the same 
level as offensive operations.4 5  In addition, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, has 
been completely revised. These changes send a clear message to Army leaders 
that they can no longer focus only on the kinetic and conventional side of 
conflicts.  Unfortunately, these changes in the manuals are directed to senior 
military leaders who provide guidance in creating campaign plans. They are not 
aimed at the Soldier or junior company grade officers who are on the ground 
attempting to work through the difficulties of conducting non-kinetic operations, or 
the softer side of a COIN. 
 In 2005, The U.S. government was “gaug[ing] success in Iraq by such 
traditional indicators as the number of attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi police 
forces, and military members, oil production, and increases in basic services 
such as water and food.”6  CAPT Bole, USN, heard a very different answer when 
he conducted an interview with GEN Pace, then, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: “I can tell you how many bridges have been built, the progress of 
infrastructure programs, schools built, and a whole host of other conventional 
MOE [measures of effectiveness].  What I am most concerned with are the things 
we have a hard time measuring; the attitudes and moods of the Iraqi people. The 
                                            
3 Kirsten Lundberg, The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq, 
Case Study (Cambridge: Kennedy School of Government, 2006) 9. 
4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 
2008). 
5 This change in the manual was a direct result from DODD 3000.05 being published, which 
also stated that stability operations should be given the same priority as combat operations. 
6 Brian Bole CAPT, Finding the right Measures of Effectiveness for Rebuilding the State of 
Iraq, Thesis (Newport: Naval War College, 2005). 
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Iraqi people will decide the fate of their nation.”7  The conventional qualitative 
measures of effectiveness are a part of fighting a COIN, but not the coup de 
grace.  How they are applied, used and managed in concert with other aspects 
when dealing with the local populace and their response is a better way to 
evaluate success.  Overall, the objective in a COIN is to separate the insurgents 
from the “silent majority.”8.  
 The conventional force and its use of the kinetic side of military operations 
is an important aspect of winning wars; however, in a COIN, the kinetic side 
becomes secondary, and the softer side of COIN becomes the main effort to 
reach sustainable peace.9  
 If non-kinetic actions are the way forward, how should units at the field 
level apply the softer side of COIN?  To answer this question, the literature 
review in Chapter II focuses on understanding the COIN environment looking 
through the lens of three holistic paradigms: the Diamond model, Equivalent 
Response model, and the Counterinsurgency framework. Chapter III describes 
the content analysis methodology used to identify four fundamental themes 
derived from the literature and describe what is needed to implement the softer 
side of COIN.  Chapter IV assesses the progress to date of the adaptations 
required to introduce COIN to field operations.  The chapter also includes my 
recommendations for continued efforts in the future.   
                                            
7 Bole, Finding the right Measures of Effectiveness. 
8 The “silent majority” refers to the large percentage of the populace that does not support 
the insurgency, or the coalition forces.  T.E. Lawrence also wrote, “rebellions can be made by two 
percent active striking force and ninety-eight percent passively sympathetic.” Additionally, “the 
reason for this passivity among populations is that, so long as their security is a risk, individuals 
[whom] take sides in an insurgency expose themselves to retribution.” 
9 Negative Peace – absence of active armed conflict 
Positive Peace – Negative Peace, plus root cause of conflict being addressed and locals 
have a sense of empowerment, participation, and accountability 
Sustainable Peace – the ability of a society to resolve potential conflicts and infringements of 
the law on an impartial and transparent basis in accordance with the law.   
Definitions from: Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, Ian Smillie, Ted van Baarda and Anthony and 
Welch, Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the perceptions of local communities, 
peace support operations, and assistance agencies, Case Study (Medford: Feinstein International 
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II. DEFINING THE COIN ENVIRONMENT 
An insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step 
by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading 
finally to the overthrow of the existing order.10 
A counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an 
insurgency.11 
A. WHAT IS COIN? 
 The broadest definition of a COIN is any action that prevents an 
insurgency from attaining its objectives, thereby maintaining security, stability, 
and civil services within sovereign boundaries. In order to understand how to 
conduct an effective COIN operation, the counterinsurgent must understand the 
insurgents’ cause, including their approach to advancing the insurgency.12  “This 
information is essential to the counterinsurgent’s development of effective 
programs that attack the insurgency’s root cause.”13  Before pursuing a COIN 
strategy, the counterinsurgent needs to understand the environment that allowed 
the insurgency to begin in the first place. 
1. Initial State Conditions 
 The context for an insurgency is determined by the state government and 
the relationship it has with its population.  This relationship has been described 
                                            
10 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger 
Security International, 2006) 2. 
11  Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 1997). 
12  Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Army, 2007). Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 2007): 9, 1-25. 
13 Ibid.   
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as the social equilibrium of the population.14  The scale of social equilibrium has 
two extremes: utopia (positive) on one end and despotism (negative) on the 
other.  The sufficient conditions necessary for a revolt lie closer to the negative 
end of the spectrum.  An insurgency would be difficult to initiate under Utopian 
conditions, because the population is content with the current regime leaving little 
or no friction for an insurgency to exploit.  The percentage of hardcore anti-
government inhabitants would be very small, while the population that supports 
the government would be high. This would eliminate the ability of an insurgent 
organization to hide among the population.  In addition, this pro-state 
environment would reduce the insurgency’s ability to procure its basic 
requirements of guns, money and recruits.  Any group attempting to change the 
equilibrium in this environment would not have popular support, and thereby lack 
some of the required elements for a revolt. (This point will be developed in 
greater depth when reviewing the “Mystic Diamond” approach to analyzing an 
insurgency). Although revolts conceivably could occur under Utopian conditions, 
to be successful they would need to overcome numerous obstacles.  
 A population moving toward the middle or the negative side of the social 
equilibrium spectrum would offer a better environment for a revolt.  Under these 
conditions, a population would exhibit some form of hostility toward the 
government, since the assumption is that it fails to provide for basic human 
needs.  The gap between the government and the population can stem from the 
government’s incompetence or policies.  The size of the gap would depend on 
the government.  A heavier-handed government would more likely create greater 
dissension than an incompetent one; nonetheless, both conditions create 
opportunities for an insurgency. 
 Another issue is the government’s use of force in maintaining control over 
the population.  One or all of the following could apply force: the Army, police, or 
special units that work directly for the government. Should these forces be 
                                            
14 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1982) 
55. 
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incompetent, weak, or corrupt, it would provide additional conditions for 
exploitation.  An incompetent government and a corrupt military force make the 
environment more attractive to a revolt leader. 
2. Organization 
 However, a government with “flaws” is not the only element required for an 
insurgency.  An insurgency must be organized and have leadership and 
direction.  Revolt begins because the current government has greatly reduced or 
eliminated the ways that citizens can bring about change.  When a single person 
or a small group of people understand the futility of their situation and decide to 
make a change by force, the next step in their chain of reasoning is to begin 
organizing people and putting resources to that end.  J. Bowyer Bell in his paper, 
Aspects of the Dragonworld, states that, “Nothing can be done without 
organization.  Ideas die in isolation: to be effective, they must be disseminated.  
And this requires organization.”15   
 However, balance and restraint are required in the nascent development 
of a counter-state group.  From the beginning, the leadership needs to 
understand that its fight will be protracted and will require patience and time.  
Insurgent groups begin by probing the population and evaluating the situation to 
identify the best place and time to attract people to their cause. There are a 
number of ways to locate those in opposition to the government.  The 
government’s policies could be alienating a portion of the population by class, 
ethnicity, or religion.  The disaffected population could be isolated in certain 
locations within the state.  Any of these possibilities could provide a target 
audience for the rebel leaders to garner support. However, for it to be viable, the 
support needs to be built from the bottom up — “build up the township, then the 
                                            
15 J. Bowyer Bell, Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel 
Ecosystem, International Journal of Intillegence and Counterintelligence 3 (Spring 1989): 15-44, 
23. 
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district…then the county…then the local Red Army troops, and all the way up to 
the regular Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing waves.”16   
 Thus, the insurgency must establish a base of diehards or converts to the 
cause.  The base then continues to spread its influence to gain support from the 
rest of population.  This plan of action is executed under the strictest secrecy in 
order to remain beyond the government’s scrutiny. The longer the revolt 
preparations go unnoticed, the harder it will be for the government to quell it.  To 
be successful over time, the rebel leadership also must demonstrate that the cost 
benefit of the uprising is in the population’s favor. Financial donors and rebel 
propaganda must attract the populations, through either conversion or 
enlistment, to support the rebel cause.   
 External entities have a part to play in the rebellion against the State. The 
external source can be from another State (China in Vietnam), or from another 
organization (al Qaida).  The external source can provide a wide range of 
assistance in terms of financial support, supplies, military manpower, guidance in 
leadership, tactics, and more to either the state or counter-state.  Although the 
external support is not a requirement, an insurgent group can draw from this 
added cache.  External support is not specific to the insurgent.  External support 
can be a lifeline to the state, through either directed military support, or economic 
aid from members of the international members.  The external actor is discussed 
more using the “Diamond” model later in this chapter. 
3. Initial Stages of an Insurgency 
 As the insurgency garners strength, it is either large enough to actively 
oppose the state or has been recognized by the state as a threat.  At this point, 
the insurgency and the counterinsurgency begin. Mao refers to this as “politics 
with bloodshed.”17 The insurgents then lean heavily on Mao’s idea to “support 
                                            
16 Mao Tse-Tung, The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1968). 
17 Tse-Tung, The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. 
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whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports.”18  By 
supporting all that the government opposes, the insurgents can extend their 
opposition to the state.  In addition, by opposing or attacking what the 
government supports, the insurgency can demonstrate the government’s lack of 
ability to protect its own interests.  The opposition force can now adopt tactics of 
coercion to suppress areas of support for the government; in doing so, the 
opposition can also gather money or information, and force enlistment.   
   Previously, the collection of disgruntled citizens were organizing and 
preparing in a clandestine manner, unnoticed in the backdrop of daily life.  Once 
the revolt surfaces, it faces the wrath of the state as the state attempts to 
smother the movement before it grows beyond control.  The true test of an 
insurgency is whether it can withstand government opposition.  The leadership 
must tend to the insurgency very closely, maintaining the correct ratio of positive 
and negative effects on the government and the population.  This ratio greatly 
depends on the environment in which the revolt occurs.  
 A strong and competent government requires a competent insurgent 
leader to maintain the revolt over any length of time.  The existence of a 
competent government forces the insurgents to attack in ways that make the 
government seem incompetent.  By attacking government and social 
infrastructures, the insurgents influence the government to either move its forces 
to protect these infrastructures or face more scrutiny from the populace. This 
limits the amount of force available to search out and destroy the root cause of 
the insurgency. All the while, the insurgents “are circling beyond sight, ready to 
strike, introduce disorder, and benefit from secrecy.”19  Another insurgent tactic is 
to get the government to act more harshly in its treatment of the general 
population.  It may even provoke the government to attack innocents.  The end 
game of the insurgents is to get the people to see the futility of supporting this 
government and prepare for its impending fall.   
                                            
18 Tse-Tung, The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung.. 
19 Bell, Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem. 
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  A weak or incompetent government allows for some margin of error by 
the revolt.  This margin creates possibilities for weaker revolts to succeed, or at 
least last longer.  For example, if a revolt comes out too quickly, underestimating 
the state’s forces and over-estimating the strength of the revolt,20 it must regroup 
and find the balance between attacking the government force outright and using 
guerilla tactics against the government and the population.  Accuracy is also 
crucial when gathering intelligence about the state’s force and knowing the 
capabilities of the revolt forces.  Misjudgment in either direction leads to negative 
consequences for the rebellion.  If the state force is underestimated, it may 
destroy the insurgency on the field of battle.  If the state force is overestimated, 
the insurgency may be viewed as incompetent and lose popular support. 
 Another issue the insurgency must contend with is a responsive 
government.  If the government changes policies that are negatively affecting the 
populace, it may be able to retain the population’s loyalty.  The insurgents must 
be aware of these changes and adapt their strategies accordingly.  Insurgent 
leaders must watch this cycle and adapt at all levels to ensure the revolt does not 
alienate a population.  This dynamic between the State, counter-state (insurgent) 
and the population is illustrated in the “Mystic Diamond,” discussed later. 
B. HOW TO CONDUCT COIN OPERATIONS 
 A description of an insurgency is found in, David Kilcullen’s article, “Three 
Pillars of Counterinsurgency.” An Australian Veteran of COIN with direct 
application in East Timor, he describes an insurgency as: 
a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a 
state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more 
popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgencies are popular 





                                            
20 Tse-Tung, The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. 
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social networks (village, tribe, family, neighborhood, political or 
religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and 
physical environment.21 
 The opposition to the insurgency is a counterinsurgents’ effort to conduct 
operations, which stabilize the state, increase security, and maintain civic 
services, all while conducting focused operations to kill or capture insurgents. A 
COIN is a balanced effort, by the state and supporting actors, using both kinetic 
and non-kinetic actions to maintain control of the state.   Balance and the 
controlled use of force are critical in the COIN environment, because this conflict 
is not only between the insurgents and the state; it is also fought among and for 
the support of the state’s populace.   
 Once one understands the COIN environment consists of at least three 
elements: the state, the counter-state, and the population, the next step is to 
describe the populations’ role in the environment.  As the insurgency has evolved 
from the population, it is there that the real battle is fought. This makes the 
population the center of gravity.22 23  In the beginning, the insurgents have a 
higher degree of intelligence, allowing them to strike at the time and location of 
their choosing. This intelligence advantage stems from the relationship the 
insurgents have with the populace.  This relationship can be strong if it is built on 
established networks (tribal, family, ideology, etc.), or could be weak, but still 
effective, if it is established through coercion.  The insurgencies grassroots 
development from the populace provides them with relative invisibility, placing 
the state at a disadvantage.24  “While the insurgency, under these conditions, 
can engage any target that it is strong enough to hit, the state must first hunt 
down the opposition before it can be engaged.”25  This type of environment 
                                            
21 David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level 
Counterinsurgency. IO Sphere, May 1, 2006: 29-35.  
22 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. 
23 Krepinevich, How to Win in Iraq. 
24 Gordon McCormick, Horton, S. B., & Harrison, L. A. (2007). “Things Fall Apart: the 
endgame dynamics of internal wars.” Third World Quarterly, 28 (2): 321-367, 328. 
25 Ibid. 
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makes the population the true objective of every kinetic and non-kinetic 
engagement.  The following two holistic models depict the environment, 
complexity, and aspects to take into consideration while conducting a COIN.  
These two paradigms illustrate the overall literature and philosophies of 
conducting a COIN. 
1. Diamond Model 
The first is the “Diamond” model developed by Gordon McCormick, 
department head of the Defense Analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS).26  The diamond illustrates the dynamics among the three core 
actors in an insurgency—the state, the population, and the counter-state or 
insurgents.  The model includes a fourth actor – the external or international 
actors.  While it would appear logically to consider coalition COIN forces under 
the external actors heading, the model suggests they be included under the state 
since.  The assumption is they are working by with and through a willing and 
legitimate partner nation to assist in that country’s COIN effort (Iraq and 
Afghanistan are COIN aberrations where an external force, the U.S., assumed 
the role of the state until a functioning legitimate government were established).  
In McCormick’s model, the external actor is meant to encompass the 
international community writ large (states, NGOs, IGOs, PVOs, etc).27  In this 
regard, the state either tries to increase its legitimacy in the international arena in 
order to garner support, or attempts to minimize the insurgent group’s external 
support and sanctuaries.28  The Diamond model helps to visualize the 
relationships and appropriate state action against the counter-state.  
                                            
26 Gordon McCormick is the Department Head for the Defense Analysis curriculum at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and teaches the Guerilla Warfare seminar that covers irregular, 
unconventional, guerilla, and insurgent warfare.  The “diamond” model has been published in 
numerous articles.  The following article best describes the “diamond” model, Eric Wendt, (2005). 
Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling. Special Warfare, 18 (2)., which I will use to reference the 
model. 
27 Wendt, Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling. 
28 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.   Diamond Model  
 
According to the “Diamond” model, the state must first employ indirect 
action against the counter-state by working with or through the population, thus 
limiting the counter-state’s ability to move and act within or among society.  The 
government can do this by increasing police presence, neighborhood watches, 
and community programs. When the relationship between the state and the 
population is stronger than the relationship between the counter-state and the 
population, the counter-state’s actions are limited and more visible.  As the 
counter-state becomes more visible, the state can employ more direct action 
against them. One means to determine the population’s alignment is to conduct 
polls, surveys, and interviews.29 If the measurement is high, then support for the 
government is high, thereby assisting in gaining actionable intelligence about the 
                                            
29 Craig Cohen, Stabilization and Reconstruction, Working Group Report (Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2006) 6. 
Diamond Model 
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insurgency.  If the measurement is low, then stability will be generally low due to 
lack of confidence in the government’s ability to provide basic services and 
security.  The measurement may also indicate divisions within the population. 
The counter-state has a reciprocal action to indirectly attack the state, 
while directly applying tactics of coercion or fear against the population in order 
to maintain their advantage.  The actions of the counter-state are to disrupt the 
state’s ability to influence the population by demonstrating their inability to 
provide security.  The lack of security inhibits the population from assisting the 
state against the counter-state.  The inability of the government to provide 
adequate security may require the state to increase their own use of force to 
suppress the insurgency.  However, the use of force must be balanced and 
checked, to prevent the population from moving from the silent majority to 
insurgent. Ultimately, the state/counter-state conflict is about control or influence 
over the population to maintain domestic stability. 
The bottom half of the diamond illustrates the relationship external actors 
have with both the state and counter-state.  Both the state and counter-state 
attempt to garner support by demonstrating their capability and legitimacy.  The 
counter-state may be able to gain support solely due to their ideology.  While the 
state must demonstrate some degree of legitimacy in order to receive external 
support from some entities, while others provide support to aid or increase the 
states legitimacy.  The state works through the external actors to apply external 
pressure upon insurgent supporters, in order to drive a wedge between the them 
and the insurgency.  The counter-states objective is to either attack the external 
actors (NGO, IGO, PVOs, etc) directly, or indirectly (terrorist attacks against 
countries supporting the state).  The counter-state’s overall goal is to reduce or 
eliminate the support to the state due to the insecurity of the state, or through the 
external states citizens losing support for the effort.30 
                                            
30 Mark Rigstad, Jus Ad Bellum After 9/11: A State of the Art Report, The International Public 
Theory Beacon (Oakland: IPT, 2007) 25. 
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The measure of stability is important to understand the environment within 
which the government must exercise control.  In a stable state, control is more 
easily maintained, because a generally satisfied population gives control to the 
government via consensus.  In an unstable society, the government must 
establish control via more coercive means, which may come at a higher cost and 
with the risk of further alienation.  If a government fails to maintain depth and 
breadth of control, it creates a vacuum in which de-stabilizing factors can 
organize and grow. There is a delicate balance forces must maintain while 
fighting a COIN. 
C. HOW TO CONDUCT COIN AT THE FIELD LEVEL 
 Understanding the insurgent atmosphere, the “Diamond” model provides 
the basic skeleton of the strategic implications nested within a COIN. Until 
recently, little had been published for the practitioner on the ground fighting an 
insurgency.  This may be because since to the beginning of the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), the overall command philosophy has not changed much. 
Conventional units were doing what they did best, using kinetic force to dominate 
the battlefield. However, as discussed already, conventional tactics do not have 
the same result on an unconventional battlefield; instead, conventional tactics 
typically deepen the divide between local nationals and coalition forces, thereby 
allowing the insurgents to better manipulate the local populace. The military’s 
stagnant Iraq COIN strategy seems to have changed with the rotation of military 
leadership.   
 Within the rotation of new military leadership (e.g. Multi-National Coalition- 
Iraq (MNC-I)  and CENTCOM commanders, and a new Secretary of Defense) 
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and new updates and publications (DOD 3000.531, NSPD-4432 and military field 
manuals FM 133, 3-034, 3-2435), a new strategy has evolved with greater 
emphasis on Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction (SSTR)  for fighting a 
COIN in Iraq.  
 Unfortunately, there is a catch to this adjustment. Most changes were 
directed to or written for senior military leaders to provide guidance in creating 
strategic plans.  These documents and manuals are helpful, but they leave a void 
for the Soldier and junior company grade officers on the ground who are 
attempting to work through the difficulties of conducting non-kinetic actions. 
These non-kinetic actions are essential in prosecuting a COIN operation.  As we 
see below the use of violence in a COIN can have very detrimental effects on the 
overall COIN strategy. 
1. Equivalent Response Model 
Eric Wendt, discusses another model that depicts the use of force within a 
COIN environment.  The Equivalent Response Model examines the effect that 
violence has on the level of support given by the population to either the 
                                            
31 This Directive provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint 
operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop; establishes DoD policy and 
assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to 
conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of 
Defense under Sections 113 and 153 of title 10, United States Code and the guidance and 
responsibilities assigned in Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011; and 
Supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuances.  Such instances shall be identified 
to the office of primary responsibility for this Directive as listed at web site 
www.dtic.mil/whs.directives. 
32 The purpose of NSPD-44 was to create a plan for managing inter-agency coordination in 
reconstruction and stabilization situations. It establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization to oversee and help integrate all DOD and civilian 
contingency planning. It specifies that the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) should take the lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of all 
departments and agencies, civilian and military, for reconstruction and stabilization purposes. 
33 Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2005). FM 1 The Army. Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Army. 
34 Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2008). FM 3-0 Operations. Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Army. 
35 Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2007). FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Army.  
 17
insurgent or the counterinsurgent.36  Violence is one of the key components of an 
insurgency.  Therefore, the insurgent must use force in order to overthrow the 
government.  Insurgent violence is instrumental in a wide variety of instances; 
however, it is particularly useful as a means of gaining, extending, and protecting 
power.  Just as the use of violence is beneficial to the insurgent, it is also 
beneficial to the counterinsurgent, but in a different manner.  For the 











Figure 2.   Equivalent Response Model 
 
Measured and proportional responses are usually covered within the 
theater’s Rules of Engagement (ROE)37.  An example of units adapting their use 
of force in accordance with the understanding of the measured and proportional 
response concept is changing weapon systems to create the desired effect.  
                                            
36 Wendt, Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling. 
37 (NATO) Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances 
and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other 
forces encountered. 
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Originally, the thought was to fight against an insurgent firing from a building with 
the least damage-producing weapon, in this case the .50 caliber machine gun 
instead of a tank round.  However, the rounds of the machine gun were 
penetrating through multiple walls causing excessive damage and casualties. 
Forces switched to the 120 mm High Energy Anti-Tank (HEAT)  round.  The tank 
round was more accurate and detonated upon impact to neutralize the area 
instead of additional surrounding areas. This moved the response to within the 
appropriate response area.38  
Measured and proportional responses are important, but accuracy is more 
critical. Proportionality does not matter if the response was not accurate in the 
first place.  Accuracy not only pertains to the direction of a weapon system, 
but also to a unit’s actions against the population to find and capture insurgents.  
This is a key point.  For a unit to be successful in its targeting of insurgents, it 
must have accurate intelligence.  In order to have good intelligence, it must 
receive good information from the local population.  In order to receive good 
information, it must have established good relationships with the population.  
These three models demonstrate both the counterinsurgent’s path and its 
difficulties.  Although we must remember that these models are “simply 
theoretical models, and thus a brutal oversimplification of an infinitely complex 
reality,” a key question must be addressed: How can we seek to operate in this 
environment?39  
2. Importance of Balance 
Achieving balance on many different levels is a major part of a COIN. This  
includes the balance between levels of violence used by both the insurgent and 
the counterinsurgent; the balance between reconstruction efforts and security 
levels; the balance among military, government, and non-government 
                                            
38 LTC Pat White, "Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf," Armor November-December 
(2004): 7-12. 
39 David J. Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C. (September 28, 2006).  
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organizations working together for stability and reconstruction; and the balance 
between kinetic and non-kinetic operations. GEN (ret.) Krulak, USMC, first 
introduced this concept in Marine Magazine article, titled “The Strategic Corporal: 
Leadership in the Three Block War.” The following excerpt from GEN Krulak’s 
article provides a rich overview of the complexity and numerous issues that must 
be addressed by the counterinsurgent without relying solely on kinetic means. 
The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguishing 
combatant from non-combatant, will blur and adversaries, 
confounded by our ‘conventional’ superiority, will resort to 
asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further 
complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose 
presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before 
an international audience. The Corps has described such 
amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war -- contingencies in 
which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical 
challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three 
contiguous city blocks.40 
 As previously discussed, the insurgent groups must also sustain balance. 
Expanding and growing too quickly would expose them to the state, remove their 
advantage of blending in with the population, and destine them for almost certain 
failure.41  This same guidance holds true for the counterinsurgent who moves too 
quickly from kinetic to non-kinetic means of combating the insurgency and 
establishing peace in a COIN environment.  Security is an initial requirement, 
which must be maintained throughout the COIN.  However, nothing prevents the 
counterinsurgent from establishing the foundation of nascent networks of support 
among the populace and in so doing building a divide between the population 
and the insurgency.  “[The] functional objective is to impose a measure of control 
on the overall environment.  But in such a complex, multi-actor environment, 
                                            
40 C. C. Krulak (1999). The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. Marines 
Magazine, 11-23. 
41 McCormick, et al., 2007, 328. 
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“control” does not mean imposing order through unquestioned dominance, so 
much as achieving collaboration towards a set of shared objectives.”42  
 Just as Kilcullen did not want to marginalize the lethal struggle to control the 
population, I too, do not wish to marginalize the importance of security at the 
expense of Stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Areas with a high level of 
insurgent activity do not have the necessary levels of consensus or a dominant level 
of coercion to justify SSTR efforts. “But killing the enemy is not the sole objective — 
and in a counterinsurgency environment, operating amongst the people, force is 
always attended by collateral damage, alienated populations, feuds and other 
unintended consequences. Politically, the more force you have to use, the worse the 
campaign is going.”43  This is where we find the units on the ground. They must find 
unconventional measures of effectiveness, maintain ‘control’ without increasing their 
enemies, and develop the infrastructure—government, security forces, and basic 
human services—to begin the rebuilding process. 
D. COIN BASICS FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
Kilcullen’s article points out a central tenet in COIN—a united effort by all 
organizations is needed to fight a COIN.  All agencies, regardless of their desire for 
independence from government or military control, need to recognize the importance 
of operating within an overall COIN framework to ensure a unity of effort at best, 
collaboration, or deconfliction at the very least.44 45  To prevent wasted work and 
effort, the framework below is one attempt to model interagency interactions to 
support COIN and maintain control.  The degree of control is dependent on the sum 
of the strength of each pillar.  If one of the pillars were weak or nonexistent, then the 
ability to control the population would collapse.46  Control depends on mutual 
                                            
42 Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 GEN David Petraeus, (2008). Multi-National Forces-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency 
Guidance. Military Review, 2. 
46 Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. 
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dependence among the pillars.  They must work in concert with the appropriate 
support is spread across security, political, and economic concerns.47 
 
 
Figure 3.   Counterinsurgency Framework 
 
Although, the Counterinsurgency Framework in Figure 4 demonstrates the 
strategic and operational requirements, it is still lacking in one aspect.  If 
information is the foundation then how does one gain the information dominance 
to successfully establish the three pillars?  On this point, the model is silent.  Ask 
soldiers how to clear a building, and they would simply state, “execute battle drill 
six”. In the same field manual (The Infantry Platoon Handbook, FM 7-848), one 
will also find how to react to or conduct an ambush.  The supporting tasks 
                                            
47 Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. 
48 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon Handbook 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1992). 
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required to accomplish these tasks are listed in the STP 21-1-SMCT49 50, which 
breaks the overall task down to individual common tasks.  If clearing a building is 
one of the most difficult conventional tasks to accomplish, and there are 
systematic instructions on how to conduct the tactic, then where are the manuals 
that lay out how to conduct the non-kinetic side of a COIN?  How does a unit go 
about winning popular support in a COIN?  The next chapter will discuss the 
research method I used to identify the common tasks required to conduct the 
softer side of COIN. 
 
                                            
49 Headquarters, Deaprtment of the Army, STP 21-1-SMCT Soldier's Manual of Common 
Tasks, Skill Level 1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 1990). 
50 ARTEP 7-8-Drill & ARTEP 7-8-MTP also provide detailed steps and skills required to 
accomplish each conventional task.  ARTEPs are used to evaluate units as they conduct training 
to ensure the tactics are being executed properly. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This is a game of wits and will.  You’ve got to be learning and 
adapting constantly to survive. 
General Peter Schoomaker 
A. GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency manual has been a significant publication for 
practitioners to turn to for guidance. As stated in Chapter II there are numerous 
intangibles in conducting a COIN, which prevent the manual from addressing 
every aspect.  Additionally, the manual is doctrine, which by default requires it to 
be written with big brush strokes rather than detailed descriptions for operations.  
Just as the manual for counterinsurgency is broadly written, so are the 
references that address some of the non-kinetic sides of COIN: Field Manuals for 
Stability and Support Operations (FM 3-07)51, Peace Operations (3-07.31)52, and 
Peace Building: A Field Guide53. These references are not, by design, meant to 
be used during a COIN; however, the books provide insight into aspects that 
need to be taken into consideration to increase the legitimacy of the State 
through non-kinetic means.   
 A lack of guidance has promoted practitioners to search for techniques to 
fill the void and help them in conducting COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan 
operations.  Leaders and Soldiers are turning to extant texts to gain better insight 
on COIN and explore how particular points of doctrine are applied in the field. 
 Furthermore, the military uses numerous organizations to assist in 
gathering and publishing lessons learned, best practices, Tactics, Techniques, 
                                            
51 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support 
Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 2003). 
52 Headquarters, Deaprtment of the Army, FM 3-07.31 Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Army, 2003). 
53 Luc Reychler and T. Paffenholtz, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publisher, 2001). 
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and Procedures (TTPs),  and personal experiences.  The Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL), Battle Command Knowledge Center (BCKS), 
Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO),  COIN Academy, Military Review, 
Small Wars Journal, and branch of service and operational specialty specific 
magazines (Armor, Filed Artillery, Infantry Bugle, etc.), are just a few currently in 
use. There are more journals and data collection groups, which cater to more 
specific themes, developing all the time. 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application.54 
 This definition of doctrine from the Department of Defense demonstrates 
the use of doctrine and explains the areas in which doctrine can be helpful.  
Unfortunately, it still leaves a void for Soldiers and junior company grade officers 
on the ground at the field level to work through the difficulties of conducting “war 
at the graduate level”55. From my own experience as a company commander in 
Iraq, as well as other officers’ articles referencing their experiences in Iraq, a 
large component is missing in these more formal doctrinal statements.  My intent 
in this thesis is to draw on practitioner insights and observations from the 
literature and add those of my own to create a “grounded theory” that informs 
junior leaders and their Soldiers on how to conduct the softer side of a COIN.   
 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss first developed grounded theory in 




                                            
54 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01744.html (accessed November 10, 2008). 
55 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Army, 2007).  
56 B. Glaser & A. Strauss (1967), The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine. 
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data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves.”57  Data are 
collected through personal observations and experiences, interactions, and 
subject specific materials.58  
 Furthermore, in developing the grounded theory, I will use content 
analysis. This methodology analyzes text based on certain words or phrases 
within selected text.  As the text is read, key words or phrases, which support the 
overall theme or themes within the article are identified.  Content analysis has 
many diverse uses. For this thesis, I will use it to establish what practitioners 
determine are the most important aspects of fighting an insurgency, with the 
emphasis on the less tangible aspects of the softer side of a COIN.  Within 
content analysis, there are two categories: conceptual and relational analysis.  
Conceptual analysis, which will be part of my delimiting process, determines the 
most prevalent themes throughout each article.  Using conceptual content 
analysis of practitioner-written articles that discuss first-person experiences 
conducting operations within a COIN environment,59 I will identify what key 
aspects of success to develop a more grounded approach to the softer side of 
conducting a COIN.  In Chapter IV, I use relational analysis to determine the 
underlying efforts by leaders to adjust the methods that support better non-kinetic 
operations. 
B. ARTICLE SELECTION PROCESS  
 The publication of articles from military leaders writing about their 
experience conducting a COIN began soon after the first Soldiers and Marines 
returned from their first tour in Iraq or Afghanistan.  These articles focused on 
either the tactics and TTPs for fighting in an urban environment or difficulties of 
fighting a COIN.  In 2004 and 2005, there were few discussions about the non-
kinetic side of a COIN, other than a discussion about the need for reconstruction.  
                                            
57 Kathleen Charmaz, (2006). Construcing Grounded Theory. Los Angelos: Sage, 4. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 37. 
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This is the main reason I focused my literature review on articles written from 
2006 to the present.  During this time, a new COIN perspective began to emerge. 
In 2006, GEN David Petraeus and LTC John Nagl were writing and publishing 
drafts of FM 3-24.  Lastly, at the end of 2006, when FM 3-24 was published, 
Secretary Gates took over as Secretary of Defense, and in January of 2007, 
GEN Petraeus took over MNF-I command. The addition of these new leaders 
provided increased senior level influence on COIN doctrine, which caused an 
adjustment to the COIN strategy.  “Counterinsurgency [became] more and more 
an operational theme, overlapping counter-guerilla tactics, stabilization 
operations and counter-terrorism.”60 
 Originally, I wanted to limit my choice of articles to those close to the 
ground level written by officers at the rank of Major or below. However, I 
discovered numerous articles written by Lieutenant Colonels (LTC) or higher 
which led me to the conclusion that command influence is a key aspect in 
conducting a balanced COIN effort, a point to which I will return in my 
assessment. To balance the growing number of articles among the higher ranks, 
I delimited my search to articles that mentioned COIN, Iraq, or Afghanistan, 
specifically those that addressed issues concerning the softer side of a COIN.  
 In addition, to the dates and rank of the authors of the article, I decided to 
delimit the military journals to those that reach the Soldiers at the ground level, 
specifically Armor, Field Artillery, Infantry Bugler, Small Wars Journal, and The 
Military Review.  This may seem narrowly focused, but these are the same 
journals that my past commanders have recommended, because they publish 
the latest ideas and perspectives on the military, tactics (currently for fighting a 
COIN), and lessons learned for a particular military specialty. Moreover, the 
journals’ editorial policies of including rebuttals or further insights on previously 
published articles make them credible. The journal publisher or boards vet 
potential articles, and authors are required to provide source documentation and 
                                            
60 Thomas Renard and Stephane Taillat, "Between Clausewitz and Mao: Dynamic Evolutions 
of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2008)," Small Wars Journal, 2008: 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/111-renard.pdf. 
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their biographies.  Other Army or branch-specific journals could have been 
selected; however, they tend to have fewer articles specific to COIN.  
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS  
 A matrix of the articles selected for developing a theory on conducting the 
softer side of COIN appears below.  This data set represents ideas and insights 
that, compounded together, establish the key aspects for conducting the non-
kinetic side of COIN.  The first four themes: command influence, situational 
awareness, cultural awareness and empathy were identified through content 
analysis. In addition, I found three rational themes that describe how leaders are 
expected to support the softer side of COIN.  These rational themes are 
command influence, developing networks, and balancing kinetic and non-kinetic 
military actions. I have embedded the rational themes in Chapter IV, which 
provides an overall assessment of the results of the content analysis. 
 The following matrix identifies the articles use in this research and the 
initial four themes. 






























































ARMOR or The Armor & Cavalry 
Journal61 
       
Platoons of Action: An Armor Task 
Force’s Response to Full-Spectrum 
Operations in Iraq (NOV-DEC 05) 
 X     X 
Teaching and Learning 
Counterinsurgency at the Armor 
Captains Career Course  
(JAN-FEB 07) 
 X X    X 
Iraq and the young Maneuver Leader  
(JUL-AUG 08) X X X X X X X 
Be There: A Case Study in 
Counterinsurgency Warfare  
(JUL-AUG 08) 
X X      
                                            
61 ARMOR magazine changed the title to The Armor & Cavalry Journal in January of 2008. 
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Human Terrain mapping: A Critical first 
step in Winning the Counterinsurgency 
Fight  
(MAR-APR 08) 
X X X   X  
How Information Operations enable 
Combatant Commanders to Dominate 
Today’s Battlefield (MAR-APR 08) 
X X     X 
Team Enabler: Combining Capabilities 
during the execution of Full-Spectrum 
Operations (MAR-APR 08) 
 X    X X 
Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for 
Najaf (NOV-DEC 2004)  X   X  X 
More than a Campaign of Platitudes: 
Effective Information Operations for the 
Battalion/Task Force and 
Company/Team (MAY-JUN 08) 
X    X X X 
Consequence Management during 
Counterinsurgency Operations  
(JAN-FEB 2008) 
X X  X X  X 
        
Field Artillery Journal        
The FA and Coin: Continuity and 
Adaptation (JUL-AUG 06)  X   X  X 
3rd ID: 1-10 FA as a Maneuver and Fires 
Task Force in OIF III  
(MAY-JUN 06) 
X X   X X X 
Developing Cultural Understanding in 
Stability Operations: a Three Step 
Process  
(JAN-FEB 07) 
 X X X   X 
How to visualize and Shape the 
Information Environment  
(NOV-DEC 06) 
X X     X 
NGOs in CMO    X  X X 
        
Infantry Bugler        
Incorporating Civil Affairs Teams into 
Infantry Company Operations (Winter 
2005) 
     X X 
Devil Chapter in Iraq: What does a 
National Guard BCT bring to the fight? 
(Winter 2006) 
 X    X X 
From the Chief of the Infantry (        
Military Review        
Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: 
OEF-Philippines and indirect approach  
(NOV-DEC 2006) 
X X     X 
Learning from Modern War  
(MAR-APR 2008) 
 
 X     X 
Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point 
(MAR-APR 2008)  X    X X 
Human terrain mapping: a critical first X X X  X  X 
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step to winning the COIN fight 
(MAR-APR 2008) 
Hybrid Wars (MAR-APR 2008) X X      
The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade 
Combat Team Commander’s Perspective 
on Information Operations (2006) 
X X X X X X X 
A Strategic Failure: American information 
control policy in occupied Iraq  
(MAR-APR 2008) 
X X    X X 
Ten ways Great leaders Lead (2003)  X   X   
Best practices in Counterinsurgency  
(MAY-JUN 2005)  X     X 
Multi-National Forces-Iraq Commander’s 
Counterinsurgency Guidance 
(SEP-OCT 2008) 
X X X X X X X 
Small Wars Journal        
Rethinking IO: Complex Operations in 
the Information Age (2008) X       
Taking Interagency Stability Operations 
to a new level: The integration of Special 
Operations Forces and USAID in 
Afganistan (2008) 
 X    X X 
Improving Information Operations in Iraq 
and the Global War on Terror (2008) X X      
        
 
D. CONTENT THEMES 
1. Information Operations 
information operations (IO) - Continuous military operations 
within the military information environment that enable, enhance, 
and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on 
information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military 
operations. Information operations include interacting with the 
global information environment and exploiting or denying an 
adversary's information and decision capabilities.62 
 This definition works for strategic information operations, but does not 
properly describe information operations at the field level.  At the field level, 
information operations includes maintaining or improving a positive unit image, 
establishing the true story through local leaders and local and international 
media, managing crises; and managing the expectations of the local populations. 
                                            
62 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 1997). 
 30
 A new unit coming into a combat theater enjoys some advantages and 
disadvantages.  The major disadvantage is that the unit is new to the area and 
knows very little about the area or the people.  Paradoxically, the advantage is 
that the unit is new to the area and can establish its own image from the start.  
This task may be easy or difficult. It depends on the previous unit’s status with 
the local population.  No matter the situation, the unit’s image begins with solid 
information operations (IO).  COL Ralph Baker, Brigade (BDE) commander of 2nd 
BDE Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division, echoed this perspective on IO 
when he said that he “could not hope to shape and set conditions” for his 
battalions (BN) and Soldiers to be successful without IO.63  COL Baker saw that 
IO had two objectives: image development, and developing trust between the 
host country’s government and the coalition forces. In that regard, a unit’s image 
is important to both the Soldiers in the unit and the local population; it is critical to 
establish positive relationships with the locals in order to instill trust. 
 A diverse group of authors, both military leaders and civilian experts, 
concur that the U.S. Military, as a whole, was unprepared for the importance of 
IO in the current COIN environment. 64 65 66 67  Furthermore, they viewed IO as 






                                            
63 COL Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's 
Perspective on Information Operations," Military Review, 2006: 13-32. 
64 Ibid. 
65 CPT Erin A. Mc Daniel and CPT Julio A. Perez, "How to visualize and shape the 
Information Environment," Field Artillery (U.S. Army), 2006: 26-33. 
66 Farook Ahmed and Oubai Shahbander, "Improving Information Operations in Iraq and the 
Global War on Terror," Small Wars Journal, 2008: 1-6. 
67 Cora S. Goldstein, "A strategic failure: American information control policy in occupied 
Iraq," Military Review, no. MAR-APR (2008). 
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conveying a coherent message that convinces the people…”68 The right 
message and the resources behind it can sustain progress against an 
insurgency. 69   
 However, the message is not always solely intended for the local 
population and media, but can have relevance to home media as well.70  COL 
Baker stated that the unit’s image is also important to his own troops.  Negative 
media reports on the 24-hour news stations made his Soldiers question their 
purpose. .  COL Baker saw this as a flaw in the military’s ability to tell the story, 
or instill the right narrative into the embedded media.  This was caused by an 
inability to fully embrace the media as another enhancer on the battlefield.71  
Media, both local and national, cannot tell the right story without the right 
information.  MAJ Erin Mc Daniel also saw that the “slow and bureaucratic” 
means of disseminating information left gaps that were quickly filled by anti-
coalition groups telling their side of the story first.72  All of the military journals 
saw the media as a group to be embraced and given the full story quickly to 
ensure the correct story was being told. Correspondingly, in order for the media 
to get the full story, the media representatives must also invest the time, about 
thirty days, with a unit to completely understand the situation.73 
 Quick and accurate reporting is a counter to the insurgents’ use of the 
media. David Galula points out in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 
insurgents are able to employ propaganda and disinformation throughout the 
media with great effect and minimal public backlash.74  The counter to 
disinformation requires more than a press brief. Efforts must be made to ensure 
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accurate information reaches the people.  A population’s low literacy rates, 
limited television access, and irregular electricity require units to find influential 
stakeholders from within the population to continue to spread the right 
message.75 76 The stakeholders improve the message’s credibility; without the 
local middleman, the information is looked at as untrustworthy coalition 
propaganda.  The ability to publish accurate information quickly helps gain trust. 
  This point is more critical when dealing with collateral damage, both 
structural and biological.  MAJ Litynski from CALL stated in an article, “regardless 
of COIN conditions unintended consequences as a result of CF-led actions will 
undoubtedly occur on the battlefield.  Unfortunately, these actions have the 
potential to influence a negative perception of CF by the populous, or even 
worse, exploitation of then unintended consequence via insurgent IO.”77  In this 
situation, we should employ a consequence management plan to disseminate 
information, engage local leaders, provide an explanation with local leaders, pay 
solatia payments if required, and incorporate humanitarian assistance and Civil 
Affairs (CA) to discuss rebuilding steps.78  The situation is then confronted head 
on, not sidestepped as operational damage, thereby limiting second and third 
order effects.79   
 Another tactic used not only by my unit, but also COL Baker and MAJ 
McDaniel’s was a post operational phase, following a significant operation that 
had an IO specific purpose.  This entailed leaders on the ground talking to locals 
and discussing both the situation and the reason why coalition and local forces 
had interrupted their daily lives. This use of nonlethal fires is integral to any 
campaign and includes “projecting a positive message with TPT (Tactical 
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Psychological Operations Team); followed by CA teams, who developed projects 
on the ground; and Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) and Civil Affairs (CA) teams 
during the ‘mitigation phase’ of operations to assess public sentiment and collect 
information on collateral damage.”80 81  This phase allowed leaders to interact 
with locals and provide information not only about the operation, but also about 
the ways the locals could help prevent their lives from being interrupted again.
 Another perspective of the unit’s image that requires refining, in respect to 
the local populace, is expectation management.  An example comes from my 
personal experience when I was in a small town East of Baqubah, Iraq.  I was 
conducting an area reconnaissance to become more familiar with the region.  My 
patrol stopped to talk to the locals.  We met the village Sheik, handed out some 
toys and candy to the kids, and even tended to an old man’s infected injury.  
While my medic was finishing up with the old man, a woman approached me with 
her infant and wanted me to fix its limp leg.  When I told her there was nothing I 
could do, she began repeating, “You fix, you fix, America fix.”  Our military carries 
with it all the images of the U.S., including the social and economic ability to have 
whatever money can buy.  This perception sometimes translates into the local 
expectation that our military can make thing happen now.  “You can do this 
because you are the U.S.” or “If the Americans are capable of putting a man on 
the moon, why can’t CF get the electricity to come on?  If CF are not turning on 
the electricity, it must be because you don’t want to and are punishing us.”82 If 
U.S. forces fail to practice effective expectation management, the local 
population will perceive a lack of immediate responses to their needs and 
become disgruntled. . 
 An additional aspect of expectation management is the ability to fulfill 
promises made.  I have never had a meeting with a local leader who did not ask 
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for something during our conversation.  No matter how trivial the request, do not 
say it can be fulfilled if it cannot.  In order to establish the unit’s image and gain 
the trust and confidence of the local stakeholders and populace, promises made 
must become promises kept.  COL Baker wanted his units to demonstrate to the 
population that they were trustful and that they would “follow through on 
everything [they] said [they] would”.83  Sometimes this required trade-offs like the 
“need for effective economic solutions in the short-term while moving toward 
more efficient ones over time”84 – a reason trash removal crews were among the 
most common rapid job-creating project.  Furthermore, change and improvement 
should be visible, or at least have an effect on the targeted population.  
Expectation management, like information dissemination, requires the assistance 
of local stakeholders.  Additionally, the stakeholders must represent the 
demographic of the population.  A Shia Sheik carries little to no weight when 
talking to a Sunni audience. Therefore, we need diversification of the people who 
are spreading the wanted narrative to the population. 
 IO operations are only the beginning of developing trust and influence.  
Additionally, not just CFs are actively engaging in IO; “to limit discontent and 
build support, a counterinsurgent and host government must create and maintain 
realistic expectations among the populace, friendly forces, and even the 
international community.”85  Comprehension of the environment by the units, who 
interact with the populace, requires training and an understanding of COIN to 
fully appreciate, in turn, the small unit’s purpose within the Army’s overall 
campaign.86 
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2. Situational Awareness 
 A critical aspect supporting IO is situational awareness.  To better 
understand COIN, a unit needs to gain a situational awareness of its 
environment, which consists of much more than becoming familiar with the 
physical terrain.  Moreover, the local population, identified as the center of 
gravity, requires the units to “take the necessary steps to really understand and 
know [the population].”87  What do the people need? What are the demographics 
of the area?  What are the local industries in the area?  Are they operational, and 
if not, why not?  What services are being provided and what is the quality of the 
service?  These questions highlight just the beginning of what units must learn to 
develop situational awareness.  The concept behind such knowledge acquisition 
is also called human terrain mapping (HTM).88  HTM allows the leaders to have a 
basic understanding of the environment and provides some insight into conflicts 
within the region, as well as “identifying the needs of the people.”89 90  If one 
were to look at just the HTM information, certain areas would stand out as 
possible conflict areas.  Examples of possible contentious areas would include, 
but not necessarily be limited to, areas where minorities are located, areas 
without operational industries, areas without human services, and areas of 
religious or tribal boundaries.  Understanding these aspects of the environment is 
necessary in order to succeed in a COIN: “the counterinsurgent must first 
understand the root cause of the insurgency [and] the underlying conditions that 
make the environment ripe for insurgent activity.”91 
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 Another aspect of HTM identifies the stakeholders in each area. This 
identifies the local leader to address in the event of an incident, or in discussions 
of development of the area.92  Usually, there are Sheiks counsels and city 
counsels that automatically provide a source for identifying local leaders; 
however, like all societies and organizations, there are people in positions of 
authority, and then there are people who are not, but still have influence to get 
things done.  
 Incorporated into both IO and HTM is the intention of gaining actionable 
intelligence.  Information gathered from IO and HTM is raw and requires analysis 
to determine its relevance.  However, having a local provide information is more 
beneficial and requires far less analysis beyond credibility issues. “A very 
powerful indicator of [local] sentiment may be ‘actionable intelligence’ provided 
by the local population. The higher the percentage of such information, the 
greater the likelihood that the locals share our objective and feel secure enough 
to volunteer information.”93  An informant coming forward signifies the unit’s 
positive image and its effect upon the populace, thus wedging the population 
from the insurgents.94 The freer the population becomes with providing 
information, the better the environment will become for the counterinsurgent.  
Furthermore, as the level of information increases, the ability of the insurgents to 
hide among the population decreases, thus removing their information advantage 
and freedom to maneuver. 
 Building trust and confidence are daily tasks, requiring repeated contacts 
and integration into the area.  Units living in combat outposts, or at least with the 
local indigenous security forces (ISF) can most effectively accomplish this.  This 
provides the locals with confidence that CF’s are there for their security, and, 
along with the ISF, that this is a common fight.  Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
gained through personal relationships developed by CF troops is critical to 
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identify enemy organizations as targets for future operations.95  First Lieutenant 
Barry Naum writes about the effect his daily interaction had on the Iraqi locals. "It 
became evident that U.S. forces were concerned with the well-being and 
prosperity of the Iraqi people, it like wise [sic] became much easier to gain the 
support of those often skeptical of our motives.”96  
 Gaining specific demographic information is another way to get to know 
the area and the people.  More importantly, gathering it in this manner presents 
an opportunity for units to begin to foster relationships with the locals.  For the 
Soldier on the ground, this interaction is where cultural awareness, customs, and 
courtesies can have a major influence on the local population.  
3. Cultural Awareness 
An important part of this effort is cultural awareness and our ability 
to understand the social, economic and religious routine, and habits 
of the local community.97 
— MG Walter Wojdakowski, Chief of the Infantry  
 The use of a translator is an acceptable practice; however, the inability to 
meet and greet someone in his or her language is inexcusable for CFs.  Learning 
the local’s language, customs, and courtesies is instrumental in developing trust 
with the local populace.  Shaking a man’s hand, then touching your heart, is an 
Iraqi custom. When reciprocated, the gesture demonstrates respect for both 
customs and the individual.98 99Understanding other countries’ cultures is not a 
new idea, and is not used solely for COIN.  Cultural awareness is taught to every 
Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, and Marine who is stationed abroad.  FM-1, The Army, 
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also supports the need for cultural understanding. “Military professionals must be 
culturally aware—sensitive to differences and the implications those differences 
have on the operational environment.”100 
 IO, HMT, and situational awareness are the basics of establishing 
relationships or a nascent network. Cultural understanding is the key to bridging 
cultures and is comprised of three aspects: the country’s history and culture, 
language, and practical application.101  Cultural understanding, as described by 
LTC Prisco Hernandez, an instructor at Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC), is more than awareness. It is all three aspects combined as one.102  
Knowing there is a difference between Sunni and Shia is cultural awareness. 
Knowing why there is a difference is cultural understanding.  “To truly get to know 
the population, you must really understand its culture.”103  Furthermore, Paul 
Kimmel empathizes this point in reference to foreign troops providing security 
within a state: “The degree of cultural identification and ethnocentrism among the 
peacekeepers is a critical factor… The risk of violent confrontation between 
peacekeepers and combatants and among combatants is increased when trust 
and communication break down and cultural differences are emphasized.”104 
 A language-proficient military is a difficult goal to achieve.  However, 
learning key phrases to demonstrate familiarity with the language can create 
initial success when interacting with the local nationals.  Moreover, language is 
more than just words; it too is part of cultural understanding.  Understanding 
word usage and underlying meaning is more important than having words 
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translated by an interpreter.105  For example, when asking an Iraqi person if they 
can accomplish a task.  The most common two answers are either, “No” (la), or 
“God willing” (sha'a allah).  Initially, this response can be very frustrating, but with 
an understanding of the religious culture, the meaning becomes familiar.   
 The practical application of cultural awareness involves taking the 
understanding of the language and culture, and applying it to daily customs and 
courtesies.106  This implies using knowledge during social engagements, 
conducting oneself properly during an informal engagement, recognizing the 
formalities of meetings, understanding how daily activities change in accordance 
to religion, and practicing some personnel expectation management.  An 
important concept for CF to grasp is that U.S. Soldiers are “guests” within a 
country. The most commonly stated means to acquire cultural awareness is to 
embed units into an ISF unit or live with them.107  This action would quickly 
immerse everyone in the locals’ customs and culture.  Additionally, the action 
would further demonstrate the unit’s support for the ISF and increase the trust 
with both the ISF and some locals.   
4. Empathy 
 Empathy is an intangible aspect of a COIN and is developed through the 
combination of both situational and cultural understanding.  FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, defines empathy as “leaders feel[ing] the pulse of the local 
population, understand[ing] their motivations, and car[ing] about what the people 
want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the populace provides an 
effective weapon against insurgents.” 108  Conducting a COIN requires a different 
style of tactics, compared to conventional combat.  A COIN requires Soldiers and 
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leaders to be adaptive and sensitive to the environment.  It requires them to have 
a cultural understanding of their actions and the consequences of their actions 
and decisions.  These instincts are not the usual or natural attributes the military 
attempts to instill in its basic training.  This is why a unit and its Soldiers’ attitudes 
are important when conducting operations in a COIN environment.   
 One instance of empathy for the local populace occurred when I sent an 
infantry platoon leader out to develop relations with a local village.  The 
Lieutenant stated to me that this was not what his platoon was here to do.  I gave 
him a box of shoes and some toys to distribute to the village during his 
engagement.  When the platoon leader returned later that day, he came to me 
and said, “I now understand why we were here.”  This platoon leader showed me 
pictures of a dilapidated school with no desks in the rooms, and pictures of him 
and his Soldiers playing with the children, demonstrating how to use a jump rope.   
 However,  just as there are examples of how leaders and Soldiers develop 
empathy for the populace, there are far more that demonstrate how quickly 
empathy is lost when a fellow Soldier is killed or a unit is under constant threat 
and attacks. 
 Another part of conducting a COIN mission involves assuming 
responsibility for everyone in the AO, including NGOs, State Department officials, 
contractors, and anyone else associated with the military.  Additionally, leaders 
are guided by cultural understanding during operational planning to “consider 
political backlash from damaging holy sites and creating unnecessary collateral 
damage.”109  In a military culture built on kinetic effects and the overall purpose 
to destroy, empathy is a difficult task to press upon Soldiers and leaders, thus 
requiring significant command influence on this topic, a topic which forms the 
centerpiece of my assessment in Chapter IV. 
 Through practitioners, we see Information Operations, Situational 
Awareness, Cultural Awareness and Empathy as key components of effective 
COIN.  In addition to these four themes I will illustrate, in the next Chapter, that 
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Network Development and Command Influence have a vital multiplier effect on 
these components. Without command influence, none are likely to take hold.  
Furthermore, command influence is the key aspect in achieving a balance 
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IV. ASSESSMENT 
Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of the tour, while 
early successes will set the tone for victory.  You will look back on 
your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness.  So be it: but you 
must act.110 
A. META ANALYSIS 
As stated in Chapter III, my initial goal was to delimit articles to Major and 
below. However, as I read these articles I began to understand that to have a 
positive unit image with the local populace and media, to have leaders who 
understand the situational and cultural environment, and to ultimately have a unit 
that has empathy for the local population, then other factors would be at play.  
Thus, I surfaced three meta themes from my analysis that I surmised were the 
necessary elements for successful implementation of the four concepts I derived 
from the content analysis.  The three rational themes are: Balance between 
COIN and Kinetic Operations. 
As illustrated in Chapter II by the first three models and my assessment of 
the practitioner articles, balance remains as a critical factor when conducting a 
COIN. There is a careful balance between kinetic operations and non-kinetic 
operations, and there can be significant impact if one or the other is extended too 
far or too quickly is a primary consideration in conducting successful COIN 
operations.  Balancing a unit’s mission focus between kinetic and non-kinetic, or 
hard knock and soft knock searches is a difficult task to be managed by the unit’s 
commander.  
Command Influence is a major factor in change.  Even when COIN 
operations become part of conventional unit’s training or more COIN type 
education is conducted during junior officers’ development, command influence 
will remain a critical part of conducting a COIN.  Without command influence the 
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four themes identified in Chapter III would be conducted in a marginal manner 
increasing the time in achieving success.  Networks and linkages with other 
military specialty units, OGO and NGOs, and the local government and populace. 
Network development is part of human terrain mapping, but is also critical to 
develop infrastructure, or extend the correct narrative throughout the populations. 
1. Balance 
 Balance is a major part of a COIN and must be achieved at many different 
levels within the COIN. This includes a balance between levels of violence used 
by both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, the balance between 
reconstruction and security efforts, the balance among military, government, and 
non-government organizations working together for stability and reconstruction, 
and the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations.  Retired USMC 
GEN (ret.) Krulak, wrote in Marine magazine, about a concept that demonstrated 
the difficulties of a COIN and the importance of understanding such an 
environment.  He used the term “three block war” to best describe this 
environment:  
The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguishing 
combatant from non-combatant, will blur and adversaries, 
confounded by our ‘conventional’ superiority, will resort to 
asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further 
complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose 
presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before 
an international audience. The Corps has described such 
amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war -- contingencies in 
which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical 
challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three 
contiguous city blocks.111 
To paraphrase the “three block war” concept, military units prepare to engage 
and kill the enemy on one block, while conducting reconstruction efforts to 
improve the environment on the next, and simultaneously addressing the locals 
and the media. 
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 Mao Tse-Tung, considered one of the most significant insurgent theorists, 
pressed upon his people before his insurgency that conditions must be set within 
the environment for an insurgency to thrive and be successful.112 So too must 
the counterinsurgent set the conditions for the transition from kinetic to non-
kinetic means.  Expanding and growing too quickly exposes the insurgents to the 
state, removes their advantage of blending in with the population, and thus they 
will be almost destines them for certain failure.113  This same paradigm holds 
true for the counterinsurgent that transitions too quickly from kinetic to non-kinetic 
means of combating the insurgency.  Security is the primary requirement of the 
COIN; however, this does not prevent the counterinsurgent from establishing the 
foundation and establishing nascent networks to begin to increase relationships, 
and, thereby, begin to create the divide between the population and the 
insurgency.  “[The] functional objective is to impose a measure of control on the 
overall environment.  But in such a complex, multi-actor environment, ‘control’ 
does not mean imposing order through unquestioned dominance, so much as 
achieving collaboration towards a set of shared objectives.”114  
 The same sense of balance applies to reconstruction.  For the insurgent, 
attacking and destroying local infrastructures too often could have the effect of 
alienating the insurgency from the local population.  The same holds true for the 
counterinsurgent that is too ambitious in conducting reconstruction, allowing 
projects to be attacked and destroyed due to the lack of control.  For example, in 
Iraq, some recurring trade-offs must be addressed when determining what 
aspects of the Iraqi infrastructure to rebuild.115  These trade-offs are made with 
the conscious effort to improve the local environment, while also increasing the 
local government’s legitimacy.  Four aspects of reconstruction help determine the 
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trade-offs. They are urgent vs. legitimate, effective vs. efficient, short term vs. 
long term, and windows of opportunity vs. absorptive capacity of the 
government.116 Urgent vs. Legitimate trade-offs are difficult for CF required 
to stand-by and witness unsatisfactory living conditions.  However, any action 
taken quickly by CF to improve the environment automatically takes away from 
the government’s legitimacy.  Some balance is required between what a CF does 
quickly and what a local government accomplishes on its own.  By working 
through the local leaders, we can achieve the appearance of government 
progress; furthermore, CF should take every opportunity to praise and reinforce 
the efforts the government is making to improve things. 
 Effective vs. Efficient trade offs are a part of increasing the trust in the 
local government. CF is choosing reconstruction efforts that have immediate 
effective capabilities, while, perhaps, sacrificing efficiency.  As discussed earlier, 
word of mouth is the best possible means of spreading progress; therefore, the 
more visible and effective the solution, the more likely it will mitigate the risk of 
instability and a return to violence.117  An example of this in Iraq is the common 
illegal roadside fuel distributor.  It is illegal, because fuel distribution is a 
government-controlled function, but the government is unable to meet the current 
demand. 
 Short-term vs. Long-term trade offs are similar to the two tradeoffs noted 
above. This trade-off also requires some short-minded thinking to identify the 
immediate needs of the local populace.  As much as education and schools help 
develop the future Iraqi leadership, the accessibility to a water source is more 
important to a village without a well.118  Additionally, if the infrastructure cannot 
sustain a project, then the project becomes a waste of resources and time, left 
only to become dilapidated because of a lack of a supporting services. 
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 Lastly, there are Window of Opportunity vs. Absorptive Capacity tradeoffs.  
The poor “quality of life” standards become apparent when the first Soldier walks 
through a village Solutions are likely just as apparent and may only require 
financial resources to make them a reality.  However, the window of opportunity 
for reform should only occur if it does not overwhelm the government’s capacity 
to manage the change or the society’s capacity to absorb it.  Again, having too 
much initiative can do more harm than good.  Project failure or the government’s 
inability to sustain a service can hurt the image of both the CF and the Iraqi 
government.  Insurgents can exploit this failure with propaganda designed to 
illustrate CF and Iraqi government shortcomings. 
 Understanding these trade-offs and effectively managing the projects that 
are executed during reconstruction will increase the trust that the local populace 
has in both the Iraqi government and CFs.  The ability to keep promises and 
maintain visible progress, while reducing the use of coercive means within the 
environment has a positive effect on the local populace.119  David Killcullen 
viewed the use of kinetic means as a measure of effectiveness for military units 
conducting a COIN. “Politically, the more force you have to use, the worse the 
campaign is going. Marginalizing and out-competing a range of challengers, to 
achieve control over the overall socio-political space in which the conflict occurs, 
is the true aim.”120 
2. Command Influence 
 As stated by GEN Petraeus earlier in the paper, COIN warfare is a difficult 
concept to understand and operation to conduct, which is why command 
influence is critical to guide the inexperienced junior leaders through the 
difficulties of conducting a COIN.  In a COIN, the leaders that will have the 
biggest impact on the local environment are the junior leaders and their solders.  
However, these junior officers are also the least experienced in the military.  
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Some entering Iraq have less than two years in the military as an officer.  Without 
command influence to guide them, they muddle through fighting a COIN.  To 
leave these junior officers to either figure it out or fall back on what they know—
conventional warfare—is not an option.  The commander must make his vision 
clear and concise for his subordinates to understand. Additionally, in an 
unfamiliar environment, the commander must ensure that his intent is being 
met.121  To leave junior leaders without oversight allows for improvisation, which 
does not help achieve the wanted outcome of developing trust and influence. 
 Command groups must ensure that their leaders and Soldiers understand 
their individual unit’s purpose in country and that their actions are productive 
when dealing with the local populace.  A case in point, violence of action against 
a positively identified (PID) enemy is justified, but when the enemy is not PID, or 
is fighting among civilians, troops must practice prudence and restraint to prevent 
collateral damage and a regression in CF and local relations.  Some of this 
discernment comes from training, but the major influence is the command’s 
message or the demeanor the commanders portray towards the Iraqi population.  
Not only can the command group influence their own Soldiers, they can also 
have an influence on the involvement of other command enhancers. They can 
ensure that subordinates are not only developing local networks, but are also 
networking through other organizations and units that can support their 
operations.122 
3. Developing Networks 
 All of the efforts using IO, SA, cultural understanding, and empathy are 
directed toward creating networks.  Initially, a new unit has some standing 
networks to which they are introduced, but to have an impact in a COIN, these 
networks need to be expanded to encompass more and more of the population.  
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In addition to the local networks, CFs need to ensure they are including other 
non-military networks within the country.  Networks allow for a diverse amount of 
information sharing without any one node having all of the information. This 
concept is critical, especially with a large force and a complex environment.123 If 
units are successful in building trusted networks, “[they] will grow into the 
population and displace the enemy’s networks. These networks include local 
allies, community leaders, local security forces, NGOs and other friendly or 
neutral non-state actors in [the] area, and the media.”124 
 These other networks include the experts necessary to conduct effective 
reconstruction.  Reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure is another step to 
move from conflict to sustainable peace.  Combat units rarely have experts within 
their units who have any expertise in rebuilding an area.  In that regard, National 
Guard and Reserve Units have an advantage based on the greater diversity of 
civilian professions within their ranks.125  The remaining active duty units must 
rely on these other networks of experts to accomplish the right tasks for the right 
purposes.  Without access to these networks, inexperienced leaders  muddle 
through the process.  These networks of experts not only provide information, 
they also provide channels to coordinate directly between BDE partners, PRTs, 
and the National Government.126 Furthermore, CA teams are an essential node 
in the network, because of “their expertise in both assisting civil leaders in 
making community improvements using existing government structures, and in 
promoting efficiency in executing basic government tasks.”127 128  However, 
                                            
123 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The most redical reinterpretation of 
armed conflict since Clausewitz (New York: The Free Press, 1991): 109. 
124 David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level 
Counterinsurgency," IO Sphere, May 1, 2006: 29-35, 33. 
125 Naum, Tankers without Tanks in Tuz: A National Guard Unit Expereinces Full-Spectrum 
Operations. 
126 CPT David J. Smith and 1LT Jeffery Ritter, "Team Enabler: Combining Capabilities 
during the execution of Fulll-Spectrum Operations," Armor & Calvary Journal, March-April (2008): 
43-45. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Staffel, Incorporating Civil Affairs Teams into Infantry Compnay Operations. 
 50
these networks are not effective unless there is a balance established between 
security and reconstruction.  Too much of one, too early, will only cause the other 
to fail. 
 Furthermore, leaders and Soldiers at the grassroots level influence the 
population more than either middle or top-level leaders.129  This lower-level 
influence comes from cultivating networks in direct contact with the population.  
These networks provide a greater opportunity to develop empathy for the people, 
and an appreciation for their “fears and suffering with which much of the 
population must live; they also [provide] expert knowledge of local politics and 
knowledge on a face-to-face basis of the local leaders of the government and its 
adversaries.”130   
 As one can see, there are many intangible aspects of conducting the 
softer side of a COIN.  This difficult environment requires that the inexperienced 
find guidance in simple and concise commander’s intentions or direct supervision 
from top or mid-level leaders.  Furthermore, the commander’s influence on junior 
leaders and their Soldiers requires them to better understand their environment. 
This allows them to appreciate the impact of their actions upon the environment – 
both kinetic and non-kinetic.  This process provides knowledge that helps 
counterinsurgents better prepare for developing relationships with, trust of, and 
influence over the local populace.  The increased trust and confidence can only 
strengthen the security in the area, which creates conditions for increased 
reconstruction efforts. This improves the local environment, divides the populace 
from the insurgency, and achieves the objective of legitimizing the local leaders, 
security forces, and government.  Without the means to conduct the softer side of 
a COIN in junior leaders’ “toolboxes”, leaders and their Soldiers are left to 
muddle through their tour having either little or negative influence upon the local 
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nationals.  Under these conditions, short-term objectives are likely to be unmet 
and the status quo maintained, rather than progressing to sustainable peace. 
B. NEXT STEPS 
1. Counterinsurgent Development 
It is clear from all of the periodicals that a change is happening.  All three 
branch-specific journals discuss the implementation of changes within the 
professional development courses for all levels of Soldiers.  Even basic training 
courses are now implementing culture awareness training to help development 
the counterinsurgent Soldier.  This is a positive adjustment, but we can do more. 
As discussed earlier, the influence of leadership in a COIN environment is crucial 
to a unit’s ability to succeed.  Furthermore, as stated previously, the most 
inexperienced leaders are conducting some of the most important missions in a 
COIN.  The influence all the platoon leaders and company commanders have 
with local nationals is far greater than the influence of a higher ranking 
commander. They have the most influence over the “strategic corporal”, interact 
with the locals, and directly or indirectly create both positive and negative social 
capital. This level of responsibility requires an increased focus on junior 
leadership developmental education.  As much as the leadership courses have 
changed, some additional changes would benefit the leaders and the military. 
2. Pre-Commission Education  
Even though every officer who enters the military plans to stay in until 
retirement; however, it is too much to ask that they be required to take a few 
COIN-related classes from a list specified by the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC) or a United States Military Academy (USMA).  Officer Candidate School 
(OCS) requirements could be waived, depending on the extent of the candidate’s 
military experience. These courses would develop critical thinking skills to better 
understand the global environment.  The areas of exact studies would vary at 
each institution; nevertheless, they would focus on ideas that support the softer 
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side of the military actions. This could include anthropology, mass 
communication, international relations, religion, culture, civics, regional studies, 
and language. These courses would introduce ways to think unconventionally.  in 
May of 2008,the ROTC command released an incentive program for a ROTC 
language and culture project..  According to the news release, “The ROTC 
Language and Culture Project provides opportunities for ROTC Cadets and 
Midshipmen to study the languages and cultures of world regions critical to U.S. 
national security, and prepares them to respond to the global challenges of the 
21st century.”131 Basic required classes or education incentive programs, like the 
Language and Cultural project, would produce officers better prepared for the full 
spectrum of military operations conducted over the last decade.  
3. Middle Leadership Development 
 An officer’s professional development must continue past the 
undergraduate level.  The military as a whole has begun to understand the need 
to address the knowledge of unconventional operations and has made 
adjustments within officer and NCO basic and advanced leadership education. 
One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: 
economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, 
promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic 
services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military 
and police forces, strategic communications, and more -- these, 
along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term 
success.  Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to 
meet the diverse challenges I have described.132 
 However, if the Army wants to quickly inject the COIN and SSTR doctrine 
into the system, it must to force people to stop, think, and discuss unconventional 
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warfare and stability operations. “As history has shown time and again, capable 
leaders are ‘force multipliers’: they greatly enhance the effectiveness of the 
troops under their command.”
133
 The Combined Arms and Services Staff School 
(CAS3) would be the perfect place for this training.  Unfortunately, the school 
was discontinued in 2004, and the training was redirected to separate branch 
Advanced Captains Career Courses (AC3).   
 I recommend that CAS3 returns to Fort Leavenworth to teach COIN, 
SSTR, and best practices to conduct operations in an unconventional 
environment.  Bring in academics to teach and discuss different aspects of COIN, 
SSTR, networks, social science, and cultural awareness.  Introduce these 
leaders to government agencies and NGOs so they may understand their 
functions.  
 Another reason to bring CAS3 back to Fort Leavenworth is that the Army’s 
Intermediate Leadership Education School is also located there.  Then newly 
promoted Majors’ with experience in the current unconventional environment 
could mentor, answer questions, and discuss their experiences on the current 
operational battlefield.  
 Whether the U.S. military strategy is “Clear, hold, build”, “oil spot”, or 
“winning hearts and minds”, the foundation for success requires leaders and 
warriors on the ground to understand the importance of identifying, 
understanding, and accomplishing the intangibles that gain the support of the 
population.  The seven themes identified in this thesis through the content 
analysis are the foundation to complete Kilcullen’s Counterinsurgency 
Framework.  With a positive identity, good relations with the local nationals 
through developed networks, and the balance of kinetic actions in response to 
actionable intelligence, coalition forces counteract the influence insurgents have 
over the population.  Gaining the population’s support increases the information 
about possible insurgents. This eliminates the insurgents’ advantage and 
exposes them to be killed, captured, or detained.   
                                            


























The doctrine developed for fighting in central Europe continues to 
have application against certain potential future threats. But, today 
the focus has shifted to developing, expanding, and refining our 
doctrine for counterinsurgency operations based on the 
experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq…This renewed emphasis on 
COIN is right, and appropriate, but it should not overshadow the 
need to think about, and prepare for, the full range of threats our 
Nation and our Army may face. 
— General Ronald H. Griffith, U.S. Army, Retired  
 Having a conventional Army conducting a COIN places increased 
responsibilities on each Soldier conducting operations in country.  To compound 
this pressure, we place Soldiers in a COIN with minimal training to understand 
the complexity and importance of the local population and their culture.  We ask 
troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct operations unfamiliar to 
them, comprehend the rules of engagement (ROE) and apply them without 
hesitation, serve as personal ambassadors representing the Coalition Forces, 
and understand the environment and culture well enough to have empathy for 
the local nationals. David Kilcullen’s, 28 Articles, emphasizes this point, 
“Corporals and privates will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. 
The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding, then trust 
them to think for themselves on the day.”134  
 How do the “strategic corporal” and the junior lieutenant conduct the softer 
side of a COIN was the question for this thesis.  I derived an answer through 
content analysis to develop a theory grounded in practitioner personal 
experiences.  Through conceptual content analysis, I determined that four 
fundamental themes were important to develop a successful COIN strategy at 
the field level: information operations, situational awareness, cultural awareness, 
and empathy.  I then identified three meta themes that drove the first four: 
Command Influence, Network Development and the Balance of Kinetic and Non-
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Kinetic Actions.  These three are critical, due to the underdeveloped COIN 
education of junior leaders.  Furthermore, I recommended that junior leader 
development expand beyond the current improvements. This will increase 
knowledge base knowledge before commissioning and taking a company 
command. 
 The four conceptual themes and the three relational meta themes 
identified in this thesis provide the foundation of Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency 
framework discussed in Chapter II. Initially, the objective of this research was to 
develop a product similar to a checklist that practitioners could use at the field 
level; however, due to the complexity of a COIN environment, a checklist is not a 
plausible solution for improving the military’s ability to fight a COIN.  No simple 
solution is available. The environment is so complex; it requires different levels of 
both kinetic and non-kinetic force to win the trust and influence of the local 
nationals.  The counterinsurgents’ struggle for balance becomes an important 
aspect — maintain popularity among the populace while conducting necessary 
attacks against insurgents. 
 In fighting a COIN, the military also has to balance COIN operational skills 
with core conventional fighting skills.  The branch chiefs each maintain a section 
in their respective journals to discuss pertinent branch specific information.  They 
all have stated the necessity of preparation for both conventional and 
unconventional operations.135 136  The additional burden of preparing for both 
operations makes time a critical factor in training.  Although, this need to train for 
both is understood, the time to conduct both is not available.   
 I recommend that follow-on research focus on ways to improve the U.S. 
military’s ability to conduct a COIN.  First, it would be helpful to determine if a 
new SSTR organization should be developed to assist conventional forces 
conducting a COIN.  This organization could combine activities devoted to the 
softer side of COIN and reconstruction (e.g. CA, HTT, PRT, heavy and light 
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construction engineers), while the conventional military continues to focus on 
establishing security and assisting in foreign internal defense.  Additionally, the 
creation of such a unit would minimize the time constraints that no limit training 
for both conventional and unconventional tasks. 
 My second recommendation for follow-on research is the consideration of 
permanent units within a COIN environment. This option would allow troops to 
rotate through the units, instead of complete units rotating through the COIN 
environment.  My reasoning is that each time a unit is rotated out of the country a 
large portion of the tacit and explicit knowledge is lost, making networks difficult 
to establish and reestablish on a yearly basis. By rotating individuals, or even 
platoons, through the permanent units, the organizational knowledge will remain 
behind.  Currently, Human Terrain Teams, as well as service members in South 
Korea, are conducting this type of rotation to limit their loss of knowledge.137   
This experiment has the potential to expand to the COIN arena as well. 
 Fighting a COIN in Iraq, Afghanistan, and possible future conflicts is a 
burden to be borne by current and future service members.  The mistakes and 
the steep learning curve required to fight a COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan should 
not be repeated.  The changes in FM 3-0 have locked in the understanding that 
unconventional missions—COIN, SSTR, and Humanitarian support—are now a 
part of the military’s future role in global security. COIN concepts and principles 
must be taught, learned and understood by the newest service member all the 
way up to the Joint Chief of Staff.  The future of the Iraqi and Afghanistan people 
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